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On  the  face  of  it,  it  would  appear  that  U.S.  workers  have  it  made:  the 
economy  continues  to  grow  at  a  slow  but  steady  pace,  unemployment  is 
down  to  5.3  percent,  employment  is  up,  real  family  income  has  increased 
modestly,  and  the  poverty  rate  has  declined  for  two  consecutive  years. 
Despite  these  favorable  circumstances,  a  persistent  sense  of  general 
unease-brought  on  by  corporate  downsizing,  the  restructuring  of  the 
workplace,  and  rapid  technological  change-hovers  over  workers’  ecos 
nomic  landscape.  Adding  to  this  sense  of  unease  is  the  growing  disparity 
in  wages  between  those  at  the  top  of  the  earnings  distribution  and  those 
at  the  bottom. 
In  order  to  enact  policies  that  can  address  the  disparity,  we  first  must 
decide  on  the  factors  that  led  to  it.  Economists  have  tended  to  use  tradi- 
tional  demand  and  supply  arguments  to  explain  it  and  to  point  to  differ- 
ences  in  skill  and  educational  levels  as  the  underlying  culprir.  These 
differences  are  exacerbated  in  times  such  as  today,  when  the  pact  of  tech- 
nological  change  is  rapid  and  growing  and  employers  arc  willing  to  pay  a 
premium  to  workers  who  have  the  level  of  skill  mdde  necessary  by  such 
change.  Moreover,  the  restructuring  of  the  workplace  to  emphasize  gener- 
alized  tasks  and  team-oriented  jobs  rather  than  narrow  tasks  and  depart- 
mentalized  jobs  has  resulted  in  the  need  for  workers  with  not  only  a 
higher  level  of  skills,  but  a  variety  of  skills.  Those  without  such  skills  are 
left  to  vie  for  an  increasingly  smaller  pool  of  jobs  that  do  not  require  high 
skills  levels.  According  to  this  explanation,  then,  the  wage  gap  is  due  not 
just  to  differences  among  workers  in  educational  and  skill  level,  but  to  a 
mismatch  between  the  skills  workers  have  and  the  jobs  available. 
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David  R.  Howell  offers  an  alternative  explanation,  arguing  that  although 
traditional  demand  and  supply  explanations  of  the  wage  gap  are  theoreti- 
cally  attractive,  they  are  not  statistically  sound.  He  contends  that 
changes  in  institutional  factors-such  as  the  increasing  decentralization 
of  the  labor  market,  the  decline  in  union  power  brought  on  by  changes 
in  regulations  governing  collective  bargaining,  and  the  growth  of  “low- 
road”  management  strategies-have  caused  the  growing  wage  gap. 
Neither  skill  mismatch  nor  institutional  transformation  fully  explains 
the  collapse  in  wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  earnings  spectrum.  More  like- 
ly,  both  factors  contributed  to  wage  stagnation,  and  other  factors,  such  as 
foreign  economic  development,  technological  advances  in  transporta- 
tion  and  communications,  and  government  deregulation,  intensified 
competition  in  the  product  market  and  thereby  contributed  to  the  wage 
collapse.  Further,  the  increasingly  important  role  of  huge  pension  and 
mutual  funds  (beginning  in  the  late  197’0s)  made  it  critical  for  managers 
to  maximize  short-run  performance.  All  of  these  factors,  none  of  which 
are  mutually  exclusive,  provide  credible  explanation  for  the  growing 
incidence  of  low  pay  and  the  widening  of  the  wage  gap. 
Why  is  it  important  to  know  what  underlies  the  wage  gap?  The  source  of 
the  problem  clearly  will  determine  what  public  policies  can  bc  effective 
in  resolving  it.  If  skill  mismatch  is  only  one  piece  of  the  puzzle  and  other 
factors.are  at  work  in  creating  the  growing  wage  gap,  then  policies  aimed 
only  at  raising  workers’  skill  levels  would  only  partially  address  the  prob- 
lem;  policies  aimed  at  other  factors,  for  example7  stimulating  demand 
and  therefore  additional  high-paying  jobs,  would  also  be  needed  to 
address  the  growing  wage  gap.  Thus  it  is  critical  to  explore  the  nature  of 
the  wage  gap.  Howell’s  research  findings  are  a  valuable  contribution  to 
the  existing  knowledge  of  this  problem  and  provide  another  perspective 
in  the  ongoing  public  policy  discussion  on  this  issue. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Executive  Director 
February  1997 
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No  recent  development  in  the  U.S.  labor  market  has  been  more  dra# 
matic  and  more  troubling  than  the  collapse  in  the  buying  power  of  work- 
ers’  paychecks.  After  rising  for  almost  three  decades,  average  real  weekly 
earnings  among  production  and  nonsupervisory  workers  fell  by  7.5  per- 
cent  between  1973  and  1979  and  by  another  12.6  percent  between  1979 
and  1990.  This  translates  into  a  decline  in  weekly  pay  from  $303  in  1979 
to  $277  in  1982  and  further  to  $265  in  1990  (in  1982,  dollars).j 
According  to  Lynn  Karoly’s  (1994)  calculations,  the  25th  percentile  of 
all  male  wage  and  salary  workers  saw  their  average  weekly  earnings  fall 
from  $259  in  1973  to  $242  in  1979  to  $209  by  1984,  before  rebounding 
slightly  to  $218  in  1989  (in  1986  dollars). 
This  drop  in  the  value  of  wages  coincided  with  a  sharp  increase  in  earn- 
ings  inequality.2  Perhaps  the  most  highly  publicized  characteristic  of 
recent  earnings  trends  has  been  the  widening  gap  between  highly.  edu- 
cated  and  poorly  educated  workers.  Two  wage  trends  stand  out  in  the 
1980s  (see  Table  1).  First,  the  real  earnings  of  college-educated  female 
workers  grew  rapidly  (about  14  percent),  and  second,  the  earnings  of 
poorly  educated  men  declined  substantially  (about  20  percent  for  those 
with  less  than  a  high  school  degree  and  11  percent  for  those  with  just  a 
high  school  degree).  Although  real  earnings  among  low-skill  men,  as 
measured  by  educational  attainment,  also  fell  in 
age  declines  were  three  to  four  times  larger  in 
which  the  average  earnings  of  college-educated 
modestly.3 
the  l97Os,  the  percent- 
the  198Os,  a  decade  in 
male  workers  increased 
These  data  indicate  that  the  growth  in  male  earnings  inequality  across 
education  groups  in  the  1980s  was  due  mainly  to  the  sharp  drop  in  the 
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Table  1  Changes  in  Real  Earnings  by  Demographic  Group,  1973-1989 
(Full-time,  Year.round  Workers) 
Yeam  of  Schoormg  1973-1979  1979-1989  1973-1989 
Men 
0-11  -5.1  -19.6  -24.7 
12  -4s  -11.3  -15-5 
13-15  -4.4  -2.8  -7.1 





16  or more 
4.1  -5.9  -1.8 
2.8  1.5  4.2 
0.5  7.1  7.6 
-1.9  14.1  12.2 
Source: Maury Gittleman, “Earnings  in  the  1980s:  An  Occupational  Perspective,”  Mmt& 
L&r  Rev%w 17,  no.  7  (July  1994),  T&de  1. 
earnings  of  low-skill  men.  More  importantly,  over  the  course  of  the 
decade  there  was  a  huge  decline  in  the  share  of  low-ski11  workers  able  to 
rely  on  wage  earnings  to  keep  a  family  out  of  poverty.  Acs  and  Danziger 
(1993)  report  that  between  1979  and  1989  the  incidence  of  low  earn- 
ings,  defined  as  earnings  less  than  the  poverty  line  for  a  family  of  four, 
rose  from  8  to  15  percent  for  employed,  male  high  school  graduates  and 
increased  from  13  to  30  percent  for  men  with  less  than  a  high  school 
degree.  The  problem  of  low  earnings  was  substantially  worse  for  black 
and  Hispanic  men:  25  percent  of  all  employed  black  men  and  41  percent 
of  all  employed  Hispanic  men  with  less  than  a  high  school  degree  earned 
poverty-level  incomes  in  1989,  far  higher  percentages  than  in  1979  (Acs 
and  Danziger  1993). 
Although  supply-side  changes  appear  to  provide  a  reasonable  explanation 
for  the  modest  wage  growth  experienced  in  the  1980s  by  the  men  with  the 
most  education,+  the  collapse  at  the  bottom  of  the  earnings  ladder  is 
almost  universally  attributed  to  downward  shifts  in  the  demand  for  low- 
skill  workers.  According  to  this  view,  it  was  the  growing  mismatch 
between  the  skills  demanded  by  firms  and  those  supplied  by  the  workforce 
that  was  mainly  responsible  for  the  reduction  of  wages  among  low+,kill 
workers.  In  a  statement  reflecting  this  skill  mismdtch  thesis,  Secretary 
of  Labor  Robert  Reich  (1993)  recently  attributed  rising  shares  of 
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poverty-wage  workers  and  growing  wage  inequality  to  the  “mismatch 
between  the  skills  Americans  have  and  the  skills  the  economy  requires..  . . 
The  long-term  crisis  in  advanced  industrial  nations  reflects  in  part  a  shift 
in  relative  labor  demand  against  less-educated  workers  and  those  doing 
routine  tasks  and  toward  workers  with  problem-solving  skills.” 
The  most  widely  accepted  explanation  among  economists  for  the  pree 
sumed  skill  mismatch  is  technological  change  in  the  workplace.5 
Although  controversial,  it  has  also  been  argued  that  another  factor  con- 
tributing  to  the  shift  in  the  demand  for  skills  is  growing  import  competi- 
tion  from  low-wage  developing  countries,  which  has  reduced  the 
demand  for  iow-skill  workers,  particularly  in  trade-sensitive  industries. 
At  least  part  of  the  popularity  of  the  technologyetrade  explanation  can 
be  found  in  its  apparent  consistency  with  empirical  evidence  of  skill 
upgrading  resulting  from  computer-based  workplace  technologies  and 
the  growth  in  the  import  share  of  GDP  in  the  1980s. 
But  the  technology-trade  explanation  is  also  attractive  because  of  its 
consistency  with  the  simple  neoclassical  (demand  and  supply)  model  of 
the  labor  market.6  Assuming  no  major  changes  in  the  supply  of  low-skill 
workers,  a  decline  in  the  relative  wage  is  just  what  economists  would 
expect  if  new  production  technologies  and  growing  imports  were  to  drive 
down  demand  for  low-skill  labor.  Without  a  change  in  labor  supply,  a 
decline  in  demand  for  low-skill  workers  should  lower  both  their  wages 
and  employment.  The  obvious  implications  of  this  view  are  that  public 
policies  should  attempt  to  raise  the  skills  of  the  low-skill  workforce. 
Unlike  the  simple  neoclassical  model  of  the  labor  market,  which  pro- 
vides  the  intellectual  framework  for  the  skill  mismatch  thesis,  the 
institutionalist  tradition  is  one  in  which  wages  are  set  not  only  by  the 
forces  of  demand  and  supply,  but  also  by  bargaining  power  in  the  con- 
text  of  wage-setting  institutions  and  social  norms.  From  this  perspec- 
tive,  an  alternative  explanation  emerges,  one  that  puts  at  center  stage 
a  new,  more  confrontational  approach  of  employers  and  a  fundamental 
shift  toward  laissez-faire  public  policies  that  developed  in  the  late 
1970s  in  the  midst  of  nationwide  slowing  productivity,  high  inflation, 
and  growing  trade  competition.  But  this  shift  in  emphasis  from  social 
well-being  and  public  choices  to  individual  well-being  and  market  out- 
comes  reflected  more  than  just  changing  business  conditions.  Since 
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other  developed  nations  faced  similar  economic  challenges  without 
resorting  to  a  dismantling  of  public  and  private  institutions  designed  to 
protect  the  living  standards  of  low-skill  workers,  the  distinguishing  fea- 
ture  of  the  wage  collapse  in  the  United  States  must  be  sought  in  the 
political,  ideological,  and  financial  realms. 
In  a  political  environment  in  which  government  policies  were  far  more 
favorable  to  employers  (and  hostile  to  workers)  than  in  previous 
decades  (Phillips  1991)  and  spurred  by  the  success  of  confrontational 
labor  practices  by  some  highly  visible  large  firms  in  trade-sensitive 
industries,  employers  abandoned  long-accepted  practices  designed  to 
shield  workers  from  the  full  force  of  labor  market  competition. 
“Effective”  management  became  synonymous  with  such  “low-road” 
wage  and  employment  policies  and  practices  as  challenging  the  legiti- 
macy  of  labor  unions  and  collective  bargaining,  demanding  wage  and 
benefits  concessions,  relocating  plants  to  low-wage  sites,  outsourcing  to 
low-wage  firms,  and  relying  more  and  more  on  low-wage  part-time  and 
temporary  workers.  These  low-road  strategies  reflect,  in  part,  increasing 
pressure  from  the  financial  sector  on  management  to  maximize  short- 
run  profits.  Government  policy  also  greatly  facilitated  the  low  road  by 
emphasizing  fighting  inflation  rather  than  unemployment,  deregulating 
key  industries,  weakening  the  enforcement  of  labor  and  antitrust  laws, 
and  allowing  the  minimum  wage  to  decline  sharply  in  value,  thereby 
undermining  the  wage  floor,  which  had  propped  up  r_he lower  end  of  the 
wage  structure. 
Empirical  Evidence  of  a  Skill  IWismatch 
Computerization  and  Shifts  in  the  Demand  for  Skills 
A  critical  factor  raising  demand  for  more-skilled  workers  rela- 
tive  to  less-skilled  workers  is  technological  change  that  favors 
higher  skills.  In  the  198Os,  the  increased  use  of  microcomput- 
ers  and  computer-based  technologies  shifted  demand  toward 
more-educated  workers.  .  .  .  Whether  because  of  computeriza- 
tion  or  other  causes,  the  pace  of  relative  demand  shif?s  favor- 
ing  more-skilled  workers  ucceleruted  within  sectors.  (Freeman 
and  Katz  1994) 
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skilled  to  unskilled  workers  employed  within  each  industry,  in 
spite  of  the  rise  in  relative  wages  of  the  skilled.  (Krugman  1994) 
As  these  passages  suggest,  it  is  widely  accepted  among  economists  that  a 
large  and  accelerating  shift  in  demand  away  from  low-skill  workers  char- 
acterized  the  decade  of  1980s.  Undoubtedly,  part  of  the  attractiveness  of 
the  skill-shift  explanation  is  the  seeming  plausibility  of  skill-biased  tech- 
nological  change  as  the  source  of  the  demand  shifts.  The  rapid  diffusion 
of  computer-based  production  technologies  and  an  increasingly  competi- 
tive  environment  beginning  in  the  early  1980s  have  made  popular  the 
view  that  the  old  production  system,  made  up  of  large,  integrated, 
capital-intensive  plants  relying  on  low-skill  manual  labor,  is  being  trans- 
formed  into  a  new  rcgimc  of  small,  flexible,  technologically  advanced 
firms  dependent  on  a  cadre  of  highly  educated  workers.  Unlike  the 
workplace  of  the  traditional  “Taylor  model,”  the  new  “high- 
performance”  workplace  requires  workers  with  the  cognitive  and  diag- 
nostic  skills  necessary  to  perform  a  broad  range  of  frequently  changing 
m&s.  Workers  with  obsolete  or  insufficient  skills  get  paid  less  and  ulti- 
mately  lose  their  jobs,  leaving  in  place  a  more  skilled  workforce. 
But  there  are  some  problems  with  this  story.  Harrison  (1994)  has  con- 
vincingly  argued  that  small  firms  tend  to  be  the  least  technologically 
advanced  and  to  employ  workers  at  the  lowest  wages.  Recent  research 
has  consistently  shown  that  high-performance  workplaces  tend  to  occur 
in  large  establishments.  However,  in  1993  the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor 
gathered  information  on  the  presence  in  firms  of  six  possible  “alternative 
work  practices”  commonly  cited  as  the  hallmarks  of  a  high-performance 
workplace  and  found  that  in  only  about  20  percent  of  large  establish- 
ments  (defined  as  having  more  than  50  employees)  was  there  evidence 
of  two  of  these  practices,  and  only  6  percent  reported  having  implement- 
ed  as  many  as  four  (Gittleman,  Horrigan,  and  Joyce  1995).  These  find- 
ings  suggest  that  even  by  the  early  1990s  only  a  small  share  of 
establishments  had  been  transformed  into  high-performance  and,  pre- 
sumably,  high-skill  workplaces. 
Yet,  it  is  widely  accepted  that  skill-biased  technological  change  pro- 
duced  a  collapse  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers.  Two  studies  are 
often  cited  to  provide  empirical  support  for  this  “fact”:  Berman,  Bound, 
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and  Griliches  ( 1994)  and  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992).  A  common  feature 
of  both  studies  is  a  focus  on  changes  between  business  cycle  peaks  (1979 
and  1989)  rather  than  on  annual  trends.  While  this  methodology  is 
appropriate  for  detecting  long-run  trends  and  for  analyzing  data  with 
movements  that  are  extremely  sensitive  to  the  cycle,  focusing  on  end- 
points  can  submerge  important  information  about  overall  trends. 
Examining  manufacturing  industries  and  defming  the  skill  mix  of  employ- 
ment  as  the  share  of  nonproduction  employees  in  total  employment, 
Berman,  Bound,  and  Griliches  (1994)  point  out  that  there  was  a  large 
increase  in  the  nonproduction  share  of  manufacturing  employment  in  the 
United  States  between  1979  and  1989;  production  employment  dropped  by 
a  dramatic  15  percent  (from  14.5  to  12.3  million),  while  nonproduction 
employment  rose  3  percent  (from  6.5  to  6.7  million).  Berman,  Bound,  and 
Griliches  interpret  the  trends  as  evidence  that  the  manufacturing  sector 
experienced  substantial  skill  upgrading  over  this  decade  and  conclude  that 
“biased  technological  change  is  an  important  part  of  the  explanation.” 
Since  the  diffusion  and  effective  use  of  computer-based  technologies 
were  rapidly  increasing,  a  technology-based  explanation  for  skill  restruc- 
turing  implies  that  the  decline  in  demand  for  low-skill  jobs  should  have 
become  progressively  greater  throughout  the  decade.  Indeed,  Berman, 
Bound,  and  Griliches  (1994)  report  a  rapid  increase  in  the  rate  of  growth 
of  computer  investment  as  a  share  of  total  investment  in  manufacturing, 
rising  from  2.79  percent  in  1977  to  3.92  percent  in  1982  to  7.49  percent 
in  1987.  Figure  1  shows  that  the  real  investment  in  office,  computing, 
and  accounting  machinery  per  full-time  equivalent  worker  took  off  after 
1983  in  both  manufacturing  and  service  industries,  increasing  from  less 
than  $200  per  full-time  worker  in  1982  to  $6m  to  $700  per  worker  in 
1989.  By  1992  such  spending  ranged  from  $900  per  worker  in  services  to 
over  $1,000  in  manufacturing. 
Yet,  the  employment  trends  presented  by  Berman,  Bound,  and  Griliches 
show  that  virtually  all  of  their  observed  skill  upgrading  took  place  in 
1980,  1981,  and  1982-well  before  computer  spending  started  soaring.7 
Indeed,  their  data  indicate  that  the  nonproduction  share  of  employment 
in  1989  was  identical  to  the  share  six  years  earlier.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
real  production  worker  wages  fell  conrin~ous~~  from  1979  to  1993  (Mishel 
and  Bernstein  I994a). 
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Figure  1  Investment  in  Office,  Computing,  and  Accounting 
Machinery,  1973-1992 
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Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  Economic  An&h;  National  lncwne 
and Product  Accounts. 
Figure  2  provides  data  on  the  nonproduction  employment  share  in 
durable  goods,  nondurable  goods,  and  total  manufacturing  between  1970 
and  1992.  The  graph  shows  that  the  change  in  this  measure  of  the  skill 
mix  in  total  manufacturing  can  be  traced  largely  to  developments  in  the 
more  trade-sensitive  sector-durable  goods  manufacturing-between 
1980  and  1982.  The  share  of  nonproduction  workers  in  this  sector 
increased  sharply,  from  28.4  percent  in  1979  to  33.8  percent  in  1982, 
and  then  fluctuated  between  33.2  and  34.1  percent  over  the  next  10 
years.  Although  Berman,  Bound,  and  Griliches  note  that  employers  use 
recessions  to  restructure,  there  is  no  evidence  that  there  was  a  substan- 
tial  shift  in  skill  mix  in  the  1990-1991  downturn.  If  biased  technological 
change  explains  skill  shifts,  why  would  the  use  of  new  workplace 
technologies  cause  a  sharp  skill  restructuring  between  1980  and  1982  but 
not  between  1983  and  1992,  when  the  latter  period  was  characterized  by 
a  far  higher  rate  of  investment  in  computer-based  equipment?8 
Table  2  provides  additional  evidence  on  the  stability  of  the  skill  mix  in 
manufacturing  after  the  recessions  of  1980  and  1982.  Between  1983  and 
1988  the  ratios  of  craft  to  semiskilled  workers,  technical  to  clerical 
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Figure 2  Nonproduction  Share  of  Manufacturing  Employment, 
1970-1992 
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Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  “Handbook  of  Labor 
Statistics,”  Bu&tin  2340,  August  1989,  Table  72;  “Employment,  Hours,  and  F,arnings: 
United  States,  1981-83,”  Bulletin  2429,  August  1993. 
workers,  and  professional  to  managerial  workers  remained  virtually 
unchanged.  But  as  the  first  row  shows,  the  ratio  of  craft  workers  to  labor- 
ers  declined  steadily  from  about  4  in  1983  to  3.4  in  1987  (it  then  rose 
slightly  to  3.5  in  1988),  These  figures  do  not  suggest  a  technological 
transformation  of  the  workplace  nor  the  magnitude  of  skill  restructuring 
that  would  be  necessary  to  explain  the  enormous  earnings  declines  suf- 
fered  by  low-skill  workers  over  this  period. 
To  provide  a  more  detailed  portrait  of  shifrs  in  skill  composition,  high- 
skill  and  low-skill  occupations  can  be  distinguished  within  whitc-collar 
and  blue-collar  occupations  in  both  the  manufacturing  and  service  sec- 
tors.  High-skill  white-collar  occupations  can  be  defined  as  managerial, 
professional,  and  technical  occupations,  while  low-skill  white-collar 
occupations  are  administrative  support  occupations.9  High-skill  blue- 
collar  occupations  include  mechanical  and  repair  occupations?  construc- 
tion  and  extractive  occupations,  and  precision  production  occupations, 
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Table  2  Occupational  Employment  Shares  in  Manufacturing  1983-1988 
Occupational  Group 
Ratio  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Craft  to  laborer  3.97  3.75  3.82  3.64  3.38  3.54 
Craft  to  semiskilled  0.59  0.60  0.61  0.61  0.60  0.60 
Technical  to  clerical  0.29  0.29  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.29 
Professional  to  managerial  0.76  0.71  0.72  0.74  0*73  0,72 
.Sourcc:  U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  “Handbook  of  Labor 
Statistics,”  Bulletin  2340,  1989,  Table 20. 
while  low-skill  blue-collar  jobs  are  operator  and  assembly  occupations, 
transportation  and  materiaLmoving  occupations,  and  laborer  and  guard 
occupations  (Howell  and  Wieler  1996).  As  in  the  Berman,  Bound,  and 
Griliches  study,  skill  shifts  are  measured  by  changes  in  occupational 
employment.  Although  skill  upgrading  may  be  taking  place  within  occu. 
pations,  if  the  mismatch  theory  is  right,  a  large  movement  away  from 
low-skill  occupations,  reflecting  the  rapid  increase  in  computer  intensity 
after  1982,  should  be  observed  throughout  the  decade. 
Figures  3  and  4  show  changes  in  the  lowSskill  share  of  total  employ- 
ment  per  low-skill  worker  in  both  blue-collar  and  white-collar  occupa- 
tions  and  the  real  value  of  investment  in  office,  computing,  and 
accounting  machinery  (primarily  computers)  per  worker  for  manuface 
turing  and  service  industries  between  1978  and  1990.  Although  sharp 
increases  in  computer  spending  per  worker  can  be  observed  after  1982, 
the  share  of  low-skill  blue-collar  employment  remained  stable  and  the 
share  of  low-skill  white-collar  employment  experienced  only  modest 
declines.  In  manufacturing  the  low-skill  blue-collar  share  fell  sharply 
between  1978  and  1982  (from  45.1  percent  to  39.7  percent)  and 
remained  stable  for  the  rest  of  the  decade,  while  the  low+kill  white- 
collar  share  declined  fairly  steadily  between  1982  and  1990  (from  12.6 
percent  to  10.6  percent).  Consistent  with  the  growth  in  computer 
intensity,  almost  all  of  the  change  in  the  clerical  share  of  employment 
occurred  after  1986. 
These  figures  indicate  that  there  was  significant  restructuring  away 
from  low-skill  blue-collar  jobs  between  1978  and  the  early  1980s  and 
away  from  low-skill  white-collar  jobs  at  the  end  of  the  1980s  in  both 
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services  and  manufacturing.  These  employment  trends  do  not  suggest 
that  computerization  had  a  strong  effect  on  low-skill  male  employment 
shares.  This  is  the  case  even  in  so-called  high-tech  manufacturing  in- 
dustries  (such  as  machinery,  electrical  machinery,  instruments,  and 
transportation  equipment),  which  show  similar  patterns  to  those  cited 
above  (Howell  and  Wieler  1996). 
In  Katz  and  Murphy’s  study  (1992)-the  other  frequently  cited  source  of 
evidence  for  the  collapse  in  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers-the 
authors  conclude  that  “rapid  secular  growth  in  the  relative  demand  for 
‘more+killed’  workers  is  a  key  component  of  any  consistent  explanation 
for  rising  inequality  and  changes  in  the  wage  structure  over  the  last  25 
years.”  But  again,  the  employment  data  indicate  that  the  skill  mix  of  jobs 
has  been  remarkably  stable  since  1983.  The  real  question  for  our  purposes  is 
somewhat  different:  Do  demand  and  supply shifts  alone  offer  a  convincing 
explanation  for  the  collapse  in  real  earnings  among  less-skilled workers? 
Table  3  presents  estimates  by  Katz  and  Murphy  of  changes  in  wages, 
labor  supply,  and  labor  demand  for  low-skill  men  in  the  1970s  and 
198Os.l’J  Their  estimates  indicate  that  although  there  was  a  downward 
Table  3  Estimates  of  Changes  in  Wages,  Supply,  and  Demand  fot 
L.owSkill  Men  in  the  1970s  and  1980s 
1971-1979 
Workers  with  les  than  a high 
school  diploma 
Percent  change  in wagea  1.5 
l’crcent  change  in supply  1.5 
Percent  change  in demandb  -7.2 
High  school  graduates 
Percent  change  in  wagea  0.8 
Percent  change  in supply  18.7 
Percent  change  in demandb  4.6 
a For  workers with  one  to  ftve  years of experience. 








Source:  Lawrence  F. Katz  and  Kevin  M.  Murphy, “Changes  in  Relative  Wages,  1963-1987: 
Supply  and  Demand  Factor,”  Quu~&y  Joumul  of  Ecornumic~ 107,  no.  1  (February  1992): 
35-78,  Table  I  (Wage  Changes),  Table  II  (Supply Shifts),  and Table VI  (Demand  Shifts). 
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shift  in  demand  fot  low-skill  workers  in  the  198Os,  it  was  modest  and 
similar  in  size  to  the  shift  in  the  1970s.  If  technological  change  indeed 
caused  downward  shifts  in  demand,  the  Katz-Murphy  evidence  indicates 
that  these  shifts  were  no  latger  than  the  demand  shifts  in  the  197Os, 
befote  computerization  could  have  played  any  important  role. 
Supply,  on  the  other  hand,  shows  a  huge  decline  (-40.9  petcent  fot 
high  school  graduates  and  -53.3  petcent  for  those  with  less  than  a  high 
school  degree)  after  increasing  in  the  1970s  (18.7  and  1.5  percent, 
respectively).  But  despite  fat  larger  declines  in  supply  than  demand, 
wages  fell  sharply  in  the  1980s  (-19.8  percent  for  high  school  graduates, 
-15.8  percent  for  high  school  dropouts).  Within  a  simple  demand  and 
supply  framework,  it  is  hard  to  reconcile  the  wage  collapse  in  the  1980s 
with  these  demand  and  supply  numbers:  the  large  decline  in  supply  reIa- 
tive  to  the  decline  in  demand  should  have  raised  low-skill  wages  in  the 
1980s  relative  to  the  1970s.  In  sum,  the  evidence  does  not  provide 
strong  support  for  the  mismatch  view  that  shifts  in  lahor  demand 
explain  the  wage  collapse. 
Joblessness  and  Low-Wage  Employment  Trends 
If  the  1980s  were  characterized  by  a  strong  “twist”  in  labot  demand-a 
sharp  downward  shift  in  demand  fot  low-skill  workets  and  an  upward 
shift  in  demand  for  high-skill  workers-fot  a  given  workforce,  the  simple 
demand  and  supply  model  predicts  that  we  should  observe  growing  job- 
lessness  among  low-skill  workers  and  a  declining  share  of  employed  low- 
skill  workets  in  total  employment  .jj  Moreover,  if  the  pool  of  low-skill 
jobs  declines  telative  to  total  jobs,  the  share  of  wotkers  employed  in 
them  and  paid  lower  wages  should  be  smaller.  This  section  examines  the 
evidence  for  these  two  predictions-rising  joblessness  and  declining 
shares  of  workers  employed  at  low  wages. 
SkiU  Mismatch  and  .IobIessness 
The  skill  mismatch  explanation  predicts  an  increase  in  johlessness  as 
demand  for  low-skill  work  declines.  In  othet  wotds,  there  would  be  a 
growing  mismatch  between  the  numher  of  low-skill  jobs  and  the  number 
of  low-skill  workers.  Indeed,  high  unemployment  and  nonparticipation 
rates  have  been  frequently  cited  as  evidence  of  a  decline  in  demand  for 
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low-skill  workers.  Chinhui  Juhn  (1992),  for  example,  infers  from  declin- 
ing  real  wage  and  labor  force  participation  trends  that  “job  market  oppor- 
tunities  have  .  .  .  deteriorated  significantly  for  less-skilled  workers.” 
Similarly,  Juhn,  Murphy,  and  Pierce  (1993)  observe  that  the  “fall  in  wages 
for  the  least  skilled  is  .symptomatic  of  a  fall  in  demand  for  low-wage  work- 
ers”  and  conclude  that  “there  are  simply  too  few  low-wage  jobs.” 
But  were  joblessness  rates  in  fact  higher  in  the  1980s  than  in  earlier 
decades,  and  did  they  rise  over  the  coume  of  the  decade?  Robert  Topel 
(1993)  has  shown  that  joblessness  increased  between  the  late  1960s  and 
late  1980s.  According  to  the  skill-biased  technological  change  explana- 
tion,  the  relevant  time  period  was  the  1980s  and  specifically  the  post- 
1982  period.  However,  Topel’s  data  show  a  clear  upward  trend  in 
joblessness  only  through  the  recession  years  of  1980  and  1982. 
Changes  in  the  employment-to-population  ratio  do  not  suggest  that 
there  was  a  sharp  contraction  in  job  opportunities  during  the  1980s  for 
those  with  the  lowest  cognitive  skills.  For  nonwhite  workers  the  employ- 
ment  rate  rose  from  55.2  to  58.2  percent  between  1979  and  1989.  For 
youth  aged  16  to  19  the  employment  rate  dropped  during  the  decade  by 
only  1  percentage  point  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor  1994).  For  black 
males  aged  20  to  24  years-a  demographic  group  as  likely  as  any  to  be 
negatively  affected  by  a  declining  demand  for  low-skill  workers-the 
employed  share  of  the  population  fell  sharply  from  72.6  percent  in  1973 
to  53.9  percent  in  1982,  but  then  rose  steadily  to  63.9  percent  in  1988. 
Thus,  the  employment  rate  for  young  black  men  at  the  end  of  the  1980s 
was  about  what  it  was  in  1979.  The  data  for  other  male  groups  show  sim- 
ilar  trends  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor  1989). 
For  all  workers  aged  25  to  34  the  unemployment  rate  was  5.2  percent  in 
both  1979  and  1989.  The  unemployment  rate  for  high  school  graduates 
was  about  the  same  in  these  two  years.  The  rates  for  teenagers  and  black 
workers,  however,  both  were  lower  in  1989  than  in  1979.  Only  those 
with  less  than  four  years  of  high  school  (about  15  percent  of  the  work- 
force  in  the  mid  1980s)  show  a  higher  unemployment  rate  in  1989  than 
in  1979  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor  1994). 
It  can  be  argued  that  joblessness  among  the  low-skilled  was  too  high  in 
the  1980s  and  that  this  surplus  pool  of  workers  was  a  necessary  condition 
Tk  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Znstitute  of  Bard  College  21 hstitucid  Fuifure  and  the  American  Worker 
for  the  success  of  the  confrontation4  strategy  adopted  by  employers  to 
reduce  costs  and  raise  profits  in  this  decade.  But  the  data  do  not  show 
higher  levels  of  joblessness  in  the  1980s  than  in  the  197Os,  and  there  is 
no  evidence  of  rising  rates  over  the  course  of  the  decade.  We  can  ask, 
then,  if  the  problem  was  that  there  were  simply  not  enough  jobs  due  to 
the  increasing  skill  requirements  of  new  workplace  technologies  (and 
perhaps  also  due  to  trade  patterns)  in  the  198Os,  why  did  joblessness  and 
unemployment  increase  sharply  in  the  19’7Os,  but  show  little  or  no 
increase  between  1979  and  1989? 
Skill  MLrmatch  cnrd  Low-Wage  Em&vment 
The  simple  labor  market  model  assumes  a  close,  if  not  perfect,  corre- 
spondence  between  skill  and  wage  distributions:  workers  with  higher  lev- 
els  of  skills  are  paid  higher  wages.  12  If  it  is  true  that  technological  change 
and  trade  resulted  in  reduced  low-skill  job  opportunities,  as  the  skill  mis- 
match  story  claims,  fewer  workers  should  have  been  paid  low  wages  (as 
joblessness  increased).‘3 
To  examine  this  prediction,  1  calculated  the  share  of  young  (aged  16  to  39) 
low-wage  workers  (with  earnings  equal  to  1.5  times  the  poverty  line)  and 
the  share  with  low  educational  attainment  (having  a  high  school  degree  or 
less).j4  The  results  show  that  the  share  of  employed  young  workers  with 
low  educational  attainment  declined  throughout  the  15-year  period,  from 
62.8  percent  in  1975  to  55.5  percent  in  1990,  a  decline  that  is  consistent 
with  the  figures  presented  by  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992).  Although  the 
technological  change  explanation  would  suggest  that  the  greatest  rate  of 
decline  should  have  occurred  during  the  second  half  of  the  198Os,  when 
the  demand  for  skills  presumably  accelerated  and  those  without  adequate 
skills  dropped  out  of  the  labor  market,  the  data  indicate  that  the  most 
rapid  decline  actually  took  place  in  the  early  1980s.  ln  contrast,  the  low- 
wage  share  of  the  young  workforce  increased  from  50.6  percent  in  1975  to 
55.8  percent  in  1990,  with  the  largest  jump  again  occurring  in  the  earIy 
1980s.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  those  of  Acs  and  Danziger 
(1993)  on  the  growing  incidence  of  low-wage  employment. 
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Although  it  might  be  argued  that  these  shifts  simply  reflect  changes  in 
the  composition  of  employment,  the  same  trends  appear  at  the  industry 
level,  particularly  for  goods-producing  industries.  For  example,  between 
1975  and  1990  restructuring  in  the  stone,  clay,  glass,  and  primary  metals 
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industry  (which  includes  steel)  resulted  in  a  decline  in  the  share  of  low- 
skill  employment  from  77  percent  to  70  percent  (representing  a  9  percent 
decline  in  the  share),  hut  a  rise  in  the  share  paid  low  hourly  wages  from 
23  percent  to  40  percent  (representing  a  76  percent  increase).  The  com- 
munications  industry  saw  its  low-skill  share  decline  by  33  percent  (from 
58  percent  to  39  percent)  and  its  low-wage  share  increase  by  33  percent 
(from  22  to  29  percent).  Even  more  dramatic,  the  automobile  industry’s 
low-skill  employment  share  declined  by  6  percent  (from  76  percent  to  71 
percent),  but  its  low-wage  share  grew  by  142  percent  (from  17  percent  to 
40  percent).15  G  oo  d  s*producing  industries  with  a  high-wage,  low-skill 
workforce  appear  to  have  restructured  in  the  1980s  by  radicaIly  lowering 
wages  and  gradually  raising  skill  requirement-in  short,  by  moving  in 
the  direction  of  the  typical  service  sector  workplace. 
In  sum,  these  data  do  not  provide  strong  support  for  the  skill  shifi  story. 
The  mismatch  assumption  of  strong  declines  in  labor  demand  should 
have  led  to  sharp  declines  in  low-skill  (and  low-wage)  employment,  an 
effect  that  is  compounded  if  the  supply  of  low-skill  workers  also  declines, 
*as  the  data  suggest  happened.  Similarly,  the  upward  shift  in  demand  for 
high-skill  workers  should  have  led  to  an  increase  in  high-skill  (and  high- 
wage)  employment.  If  both  shifts  occurred  simultaneously,  as  the  skill 
shift  explanation  contends,  we  should  observe  declining  low-skill  (and 
low-wage)  shares  of  the  workforce  and  accelerating  joblessness  among  the 
least  skilled.  But  what  we  actually  observe  is  stability  in  the  skill  distribu- 
tion  after  1982,  strong  increases  in  the  low-wage  share  of  employment 
throughout  the  decade,  and  little  evidence  of  deterioration  in  unemploy- 
ment,  employment  rates,  or  joblessness  hetween  1979  and  1989. 
lnmeasing  Supply  and  Cmding  in  Seconda~  L&or  Marketi 
A  necessary  condition  for  effective  low-road  management  strategies  is  a 
large  pool  of  willing  (or  desperate)  and  able  low-skill  workers.  A  variation 
on  the  skill  mismatch  explanation  posits  that  such  a  pool  of  workers  is 
competing  for  low-skill  jobs  at  the  hottom  of  the  wage  scale.  However,  tra 
ditional  measures  of  labor  supply-the  number  of  workers  in  particular  age, 
gender,  and  education  groups-suggest  that  there  was  no  significant 
increase  in  the  low-skill  labor  supply  in  the  1980s  (Katz  and  Murphy  1992). 
Nonetheless,  part  of  the  decline  in  bargaining  power  that  contributed  to 
the  wage  collapse  may  he  traceable  to  %nmcasured”  increases  in  the  supply 
of  workers  willing  (or  required)  to  compete  for  low-wage  jobs. As  the  middle  of  the  earnings  structure  narrowed,  low-skill  workers 
crowded  into  a  pool  of  “secondary”  jobs  that  remained  a  fairly  constant 
share  of  total  jobs  throughout  the  1980s  (Gittleman  and  Howell  1995), 
tending  to  lower  the  wages  of  what  were  already  rhe  worst  jobs  in  the 
labor  market.  According  to  a  U.S.  Department  of  Labor  study  reported 
on  by  Herz  (  1991),  more  than  4.3  million  workers  were  displaced  during 
the  boom  years  of  1985  to  1989.16  Only  72  percent  had  been  reemployed 
by  January  1990  and  of  these,  about  10  percent  worked  part-time. 
Among  those  reemployed  full-time,  about  40  percent  earned  less  in  cur- 
rent  dollars  on  their  new  job  than  on  their  previous  job.  Not  surprisingly, 
those  least  successful  in  the  labor  market  after  displacement  were  high- 
wage  bluecollar  men.  According  to  Hem,  “6  of  every  10  displaced  work- 
ers  in  this  industry  [transportation  equipment]  earned  less  on  their  new 
job  than  on  their  old  one,  and  more  than  half  of  this  group  suffered 
declines  of  20  percent  or  more.” 
The  downward  effect  of  displaced  high-wage,  low-skill  workers  on  the 
wages  at  the  bottom  of  the  earnings  distribution  can  also  be  inferred 
from  research  by  TopeJ  (1993).  He  finds  that  between  1979  and  1988 
“nearly  one-third  of  the  unemployed  had  predisplacement  wages  above 
the  60th  percentile,  and  only  14  percent  are  from  the  bottom  decile.  .  .  . 
Among  displaced  workers  with  prior  earnings  from  the  upper  four 
deciles,  current  wages  are  about  half  of  their  predisplacement  level.” 
Defining  the  unskilled  as  those  with  low  wages,  Topel  interprets  his 
results  as  showing  that  “many  of  the  ‘unskilled’  who  are  unemployed  or 
out  of  the  labor  force  appear  to  have  been  high-wage  workers  whose  spe- 
cialized  skills  have  become  obsolete.“17 
Despite  the  rising  average  premium  for  a  college  degree  relative  to  a  high 
school  degree  in  the  198Os,  a  weak  job  market  forced  many  lower-level 
white-collar  workers  with  college  degrees  to  compete  for  relatively  low- 
skill  jobs.  This  became  particularly  pronounced  at  the  end  of  the  decade, 
in  the  “whtte-collar  recession”  of  1990-1991.  Like  the  displacement  of 
high  -wage  blue-collar  workers  earlier  in  the  decade,  this  weakening  in 
the  middle  of  the  earnings  distribution  added  to  the  supply  of  workers 
competing  in  the  low-skill  job  marker.18  There  is  some  evidence  that 
computer-based  technologies  and  corporate  restructuring  made  large 
numbers  of  middle-level  managers  redundant.  Howell  and  Wolff  (1992) 
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found  that  the  use  of  new  technologies  had  a  downward  effect  on  the 
share  of  both  managers  and  clerical  workers  between  1970  and  1985. 
Consistent  with  this  finding  is  Kuster’s  finding  in  his  case  study  of  the 
commercial  banking  industry  (1993)  that  between  1987  and  1990  there 
was  a  13  percent  decline  (from  45,000  to  39,000)  in  generaI  managers,  a 
decline  from  2.9  percent  to  2.5  percent  of  total  industry  employment. 
In  support  of  this  twist  in  the  skill  mismatch  story,  data  from  the  Panel 
Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  show  that  in  the  late  1970s  about  40 
percent  of  the  sample  reported  themselves  to  be  “overeducated”  for  their 
job  (Sicherman  1989).  According  to  recent  reports  by  U.S.  Labor 
Department  economists,  throughout  the  1980s  about  20  percent  of  col- 
Iege  graduates  were  working  at  jobs  that  don’t  normally  require  a  degree, 
and  this  number  is  expected  to  increase  to  30  percent  by  the  end  the 
1990s  (Hecker  1992,  Shelley  1992).  Declining  opportunities  in  the  mid- 
dle  of  the  job  ladder  might  be  expected  to  have  the  greatest  negative 
impact  on  minority  workers.  In  fact,  the  share  of  black  and  Hispanic  col- 
lege  graduates  with  poverty-level  wages  rose  dramatically  in  the  198Os, 
from  about  9  percent  to  just  under  15  percent.  If  the  unemployed  and 
those  who  had  stopped  looking  for  work  are  included,  the  incidence  of 
low  earnings  among  college  graduates  rose  from  14.6  percent  to  2  1.4  per+ 
cent  for  black  men  and  from  11.0  percent  to  19.4  percent  for  Hispanic 
men  (Acs  and  Danziger  1993).  It  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  one 
consequence  of  declining  opportunities  for  moderately  skilled  white-coI# 
lar  jobs  was  to  force  those  with  training  for  white-collar  jobs  to  compete 
for  jobs  with  low  cognitive  skill  requirements,  thereby  creating  a  down- 
ward  pressure  on  the  wages  for  those  jobs. 
Immigration  patterns  compounded  the  downward  effect  that  displaced 
high-wdge  workers  had  on  the  wage  rates  of  low-cognitive-ski11  jobs.  As 
Vernon  Briggs  (1993)  has  documented,  there  was  an  unprecedented 
increase  in  the  flow,  both  legal  and  illegal,  of  low-skill  foreign  workers 
into  the  United  States  in  the  1980s.  The  foreign-born  share  of  the  work- 
force  increased  from  6.4  percent  in  1980  to  9.7  percent  in  1994  (Borjas, 
Freeman,  and  Katz  1996).  Significantly,  this  wave  of  immigrants  was  far 
less  skilled,  at  least  in  terms  of  educational  attainment,  than  earlier 
waves  of  immigrants  in  the  postwar  period.  Friedberg  and  Hunt  (1995) 
report  that  43  percent  of  new  immigrants  did  not  possess  the  equivalent 
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of  a  high  school  degree.  According  to  a  study  by  Jaeger  ( 1995),  employed 
male  immigrants  were  about  16  percent  of  the  civilian  workforce  with 
less  than  a  high  school  degree  in  the  nation’s  50  largest  metropolitan 
areas  in  1980;  by  1990  this  figure  was  over  30  percent.  For  women  this 
growth  in  low-skill  immigrant  share  was  almost  as  spectacular,  rising 
from  17  percent  to  almost  28  percent. 
Although  the  econometric  evidence  on  the  effects  of  immigrants  is 
mixed  and  controversial,  Borjas,  Freeman,  and  Katz  (1996)  conclude 
that  “immigrants  contributed  more  to  the  decline  in  the  relative  earn- 
ings  of  high-school  dropouts  than  trade,  while  both  modestly  reduced 
the  earnings  of  high-school  workers  relative  to  college  workers.”  Indeed, 
it  is  hard  to  imagine  how  a  large  influx  of  low-skill  workers  during  a 
period  in  which  demand  for  them  was  stagnant  or  declining  would  not 
have  a  downward  effect  on  workers’  wages,  since  these  workers  compete 
in  the  most  unsheltered  parts  of  the  labor  market.  Not  surprisingly, 
therefore,  case  study  evidence  supports  this  commonsense  view.  In  his 
study  of  the  Los  Angeles  restaurant  and  hotel  industry,  Waldinger 
(1992)  concludes  that  “the  story  of  black  displacement  in  restaurants 
and  hotels  can  be  traced  not  to  skill  upgrading,  but  rather  to  competi- 
tion  with  a  rapidly  growing  immigrant  population.”  Similarly,  a  General 
Accounting  Office  study  cited  by  Jack  Miles  (1992)  found  that 
“Janitorial  firms  serving  downtown  Los  Angeles  have  almost  entirely 
replaced  their  unionized  black  workforce  with  non-unionized  immi- 
grants.  ”  Again,  it  appears  to  have  been  the  drive  to  lower  labor  costs 
that  explains  this  result. 
Computerization  and  Earnings 
Workers  in  the  United  States,  particularly  those  with  low  education, 
experienced  a  collapse  in  wages  in  the  198Os,  but  there  is  little  evidence 
of  skill  shifts,  rising  joblessness,  or  declining  shares  of  workers  paid  low 
wages.  Is  there  evidence  suggesting  a  direct  link  between  skill-biased 
technological  change  and  earnings?  What  has  been  established  is  a  sta- 
tistical  link  between  earnings  and  the  use  of  computers  on  the  job.  In  an 
extremely  influential  paper,  Krueger  (1993)  concludes  that  “the  expan- 
sion  of  computer  use  in  the  1980s  can  account  for  one-third  to  one-half The  Collapse of  Low-SkiIf Wages 
of  the  increase  in  the  rate  of  return  to  education.”  Although  it  is  hard  to 
argue  with  the  statistical  analysis,  it  seems  fair-and  appropriate-to 
challenge  the  substantive  meaning  of  the  statistical  association  that  is 
found  between  computer  use  and  wages.  Indeed,  in  a  new  study  that  tests 
this  relationship  with  U.S.  and  German  data,  DiNardo  and  Pischke 
(undated)  come  to  the  striking  conclusion  that,  while  Krueger’s  results 
are  replicated,  there  are  “similar  wage  differentials  for  the  use  of  pencils 
at  work  as  for  computers.”  They  interpret  their  results  to  imply  that  the 
payoff  to  computer  use  does  not  reflect  “an  actual  productivity 
differential.  Instead,  the  results  taken  together  seem  to  suggest  that  com- 
puter  users  possess  unobserved  skills  that  are  rewarded  in  the  labor  mar- 
ket  or  that  computers  were  first  introduced  in  higher  paying  occupations 
or  jobs.  We  argue  that  all  the  results  in  Krueger  (1993)  can  be  inter- 
preted  in  this  light.”  It  is  worrh  noting  that  the  low-skill  jobs  showing 
the  largest  declines  in  real  earnings  include  truck  drivers  and  construc- 
tion  laborers,  who  do  not  use  computers,  as  well  as  cashiers  and  retail 
sales  clerks,  who  do. 
Further  doubts  over  a  substantial  role  for  technology  in  the  wage  col- 
lapse  for  low-skill  workers  are  raised  by  two  additional  studies. 
According  to  Steven  Allen  (1993),  the  main  effect  of  technological 
change  (measured  by  a  proxy  for  R&D  activity)  is  on  the  earnings 
growth  of  the  most  highly  skilled  workers.  As  he  puts  it,  “rising  R&D 
activity  is  associated  with  higher  wages  for  college  graduates,  but  is  com- 
pl+ely  unrelated  to  wages  of  other  educational  groups.  This  implies  that 
the  correlation  between  R&D  and  returns  to  schooling  .  .  .  reflects 
greater  wage  growth  for  college  graduates  in  R&D-intensive  industries, 
rather  than  a  negative  demand  shock  for  high  school  graduates  employed 
in  those  industries.” 
Mishel  and  Bernstein  (1994b)  find  that  technology  (measured  by  invest- 
ment  in  equipment  and  computers  and  the  share  of  scientists  and  engi- 
neers  in  employment)  had  no  greater,  and  perhaps  a  lesser,  effect  on 
wage  inequality  in  the  1980s  than  it  did  in  the  1970s.  Indeed,  as  the 
example  of  rhe  use  of  scanning  devices  by  cashiers  suggests,  there  is  evi- 
dence  that  the  use  of  computer  technologies  in  production  can  reduce 
the  skill  requirements  of  many  jobs  and  increase  job  opportunities  for 
the  least  skilled. 
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Just  as  there  is  no  evidence  showing  an  exceptionally  large  shift  in  the 
demand  for skills  in  the  198Os,  a  convincing  causal  link  between  corn- 
puters  and  changes  in  the  wage  structure  has  yet  to  be  established.  We 
need  to  turn  elsewhere  for  a  convincing  explanation  of  the  wage 
collapse. 
An  Alternatiie Explanation:  The Political  Economy 
of the Wage Collapse 
An  Institutionalist  Framework 
Our  findings  call  into  question  the  standard  model  of  the  labor 
market  that  has  dominated  economists’  thinking  for  the  past 
half  century.  (Card  and  Krueger  1995) 
There  is  no  simple  way  to  accommodate  the  evidence  presented  in  this 
paper  within  a  conventional  demand  and  supply  framework,  in  which 
the  distribution  of  wages  reflects  the  distribution  of  skills.  As  the  Card 
and  Krueger  passage  quoted  above  demonstrates,  there  is  an  increasing 
willingness  to  challenge  the  framework.  Indeed,  there  is  a  long  tradition 
among  labor  economists  and  labor  relations  specialists  of  rejecting  the 
simple  competitive  model  of  the  lahor  market  in  favor  of  an  institution- 
alist  framework.  In  this  view,  the  forces  of  demand  and  supply  set  only 
the  boundaries  within  which  wages  are  set;  within  these  houndaries, 
wage  ranges  are  set  for  each  job  and  individual  pay  is  set  within  each 
job.  Wages  are  not  a  determinate  outcome  of  the  current  state  of 
demand  and  supply,  but  an  indeterminate  outcome  that  reflects  a  corn- 
plex  process  of  explicit  or  implicit  collective  and  individual  bargaining 
hetween  workers  and  management.  As  the  prominent  “neoinstitutional- 
is?  Clark  Kerr  ( 1988)  puts  it,  “economists,  or  at  least  labor  economists, 
should  be  less  concerned  with  studying  solutions  exactly  determined 
(and  thus  subject  to  being  known  in  advance)  and  more  concerned 
with  ranges  of  possible  solutions,  as  Edgeworth  and  Pigou  and  Lester 
(1952)  have  argued.”  Demand  and  supply  matter,  but  so  do  manage- 
ment  strategies,  worker  militance  and  organization,  and  perceptions  of 
fairness  and  community  values. 
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This  alternative  perspective  builds  on  the  work  completed  during  the 
early  postwar  period  by  neoinstitutionalists  such  as  Dunlop,  Slichter, 
Kerr,  and  Lester  (see  Kaufman  1988).19  Within  a  certain  range  employ. 
ers  may,  for  strategic  reasons,  choose  high  or  low  starting  wages  and  a 
particular  wage-tenure  profile.  There  are  a  variety  of  reasons  to  suppose 
that  the  institutionalist  framework’s  assumption  of  employer  choice  and 
collective  bargaining  agreements  within  a  particular  wage-setting  envi- 
ronment  better  captures  the  reality  of  how  wages  are  determined  than 
the  conventional  demand  and  supply  model’s  set  of  unique  wage- 
employment  equilibria.  The  availability  of  information  about  worker 
performance,  the  extent  of  idiosyncratic  and  firm-specific  skills,  the  role 
of  teamwork  in  production,  the  degree  of  price-making  behavior  in 
product  markets,  and  the  share  of  labor  in  total  costs  vary  widely  across 
workplaces.  Where  the  marginal  product  of  a  particular  worker  is 
unknown,  where  variation  in  effort  has  a  substantial  impact  on  mar- 
ginal  productivity,  and  where  the  product  or  labor  market  does  not 
closely  resemble  the  competitive  prototype,  fairness  and  morale  will  be 
important  for  the  overall  productivity  of  the  workplace  and  wage  set- 
ting  will  reflect  social  norms  of  fairness  (Akerlof  1992,  Bewley  1995).  If 
this  diversity  accurately  describes  the  environment  within  which  wages 
are  set,  substantial  differences  in  wages  can  be  predicted  for  a  given 
level  of  skills  across  establishments,  firms,  and  locations. 
Research  has  consistently  lent  strong  support  to  the  view  that  there  are 
wide  variations  in  wages  for  workers  with  similar  skills  and  the  varia- 
tions  show  no  tendency  to  narrow  over  time.  John  Dunlop  (19571,  for 
example,  found  that  the  hourly  wages  of  male  truck  drivers  organized  by 
the  same  union  in  Boston  ranged  from  $1.20  for  wholesale  laundry  to 
$2.25  for  magazines.  About  three  decades  later,  Katz  and  Summers 
(1989)  calculated  for  a  number  of  industries  the  wage  differentials  that 
remained  after  controlling  for  all  the  individual  characteristics  that 
might  affect  a  worker’s  productivity.  The  results  showed  extremely  large 
differences,  ranging  from  a  21 .l  percent  premium  for  transportation 
equipment  workers  to  a  15.3  percent  penalty  for  apparel  workers.  In  an 
earlier  paper,  Krueger  and  Summers  (1988)  conclude  that  “the  inter- 
industry  wage  structure  cannot  possibly  be  interpreted  as  a  competitive 
outcome. 
The _Lzrome  Levy Economics  htitute  of  Bad  Cdege  29 lnstimti  Faihe  and rhe Americun Worker 
Fundamental  Changes  in  Traditional  Employment 
and  Wage-Setting  Practices 
In  an  institutionalist  framework,  changes  in  ideology,  politics,  notions  of 
f%rness,  and  labor  market  institutions  join  the  %conomic”  for-c=  of  demand 
and  supply  to  determine  wage  and  employment  outcomes;  as  a  result, 
changes  in  the  wage  distribution  can  take  place  independently  of  changes  in 
the  skill  distribution.  Although  we  sacrifice  the  elegant  simplicity  of  the 
neoclassical  skill  mismatch  story,  a  “political  economy”  explanation  that  is 
founded  on  institutionalist  perspectives  is  necessary  to  explain  the  collapse 
in  the  economic  well-being  of  low-skill  workers  since  the  late  1970s. 
There  is  considerable  evidence  of  a  fundamental  shift  toward  confrontation 
in  wage-setting  norms  and  institutions  in  the  late  1970s.  Not  surprisingly, 
labor  union  leaders  and  industrial  relations  experts  were  among  the  first  to 
recognize  the  shift.  In  1978  the  president  of  the  United  Automobile 
Workers  (UAW),  Douglas  Fraser,  wrote: 
The  leaders  of  industry,  commerce  and  finance  in  the  United 
States  have  broken  and  discarded  the  fragile,  unwritten  compact 
previously  existing  during  a  past  period  of  growth  and  progress.  .  . . 
today,  I  am  convinced  there  has  been  a  shift  on  the  part  of  the 
business  community  toward  confrontation,  rather  than  coopera- 
tion.  .  .  .  I  believe  leaders  in  the  business  community,  with  few 
exceptions,  have  chosen  to  wage  a  one-sided  class  war  on  this 
country.  . .  .  (Quoted  in  Gordon  1996) 
Academic  research  in  the  early  1980s  lends  support  to  Fraser’s  view  that  a 
pt&ound  shift  by  employers  toward  confrontation  over  wages  was  underway. 
According  to  Daniel  B.  Mitchell,  a  new  balance  of  power  had  developed. 
The  longevity  of  the  [wage]  concession  movement  and  its  spread 
to  less-than-dire  situations  suggest  that  the  initial  concessions 
have  encouraged  other  employers  to  try  their  luck  in  demanding 
similar  settlements.  .  .  .  Management,  cheered  by  what  is  per- 
ceived  as  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  power,  has  changed  its  bargain- 
ing  goals.  .  .  .  The  political  and  legal  climate  change  has  been 
reflected  in  a  greater  willingness  of  management  to  rake  actions  in 
labor  disputes  that  might  not  have  been  publicly  or  politically 
acceptable  in  the  past.  .  .  .  Even  firms  with  a  long  history  of 
unionization  are  using  nonunion  labor.  (Mitchell  1985) Other  industrial  relations  experts  have  confirmed  that  management’s 
approach  to  the  workforce  shifted  dramatically  in  the  early  1980s.  Kochan, 
Katz,  and  McKersie  (1994)  write  that  “now  more  than  ever,  the  U.S.  labor 
market  is  a  place  wheR  anything  and  everything  goes.”  While  some  firms 
adopted  high-road  employment  policies  and  maintained  or  increased  real 
wage  levels,  most  appear  to  have  taken  the  low  road,  adopting  employ- 
ment  policies  aimed  at  reducing  short-run  labor  costs.  As  the  authors  put 
it,  this  new  management  approach  reflects  a  “managerial  autocracy  com- 
mon  to  the  early  twentieth  centmy.”  Similarly,  according  to  former  labor 
secretary  Ray  Marshall  (1992),  rather  than  invest  in  the  technology  and 
training  necessary  to  create  “high-performance”  workplaces,  “U.S.  compa- 
nies  have  been  competing  mainly  through  reducing  domestic  wage  and  by 
shifting  productive  facilities  to  low-wage  countries.” 
What  caused  this  shift  to  the  low  road  by  employers?  Recent  economic 
research  on  earnings  inequality  has  focused  on  a  variety  of  possible  cul- 
prits:  technology,  unionization,  trade,  immigration,  and  the  minimum 
wage.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  generate  a  coherent  story  since  most  of 
this  research  is  structured  to  deal  with  the  impact  of  one  or  another  of 
these  factors  on  wage  differentials.  Regression  studies  that  attempt  to  “do 
it  all”  run  into  the  problem  of  inadeqtlate  and  interdependent  measures.20 
The  effects  of  globalization  on  wage  setting  are  reflected  in  two  key 
developments:  economic  growth  among  less-developed  countries  with 
the  convergence  of  all  nations  toward  US.  standards  of  living  (Baumol, 
Blackman,  and  Wolff  1989)  and  technological  advances  in  communica- 
tions  and  transportation,  which  have  facilitated  international  informa- 
tion  and  trade  flows.  While  both  developments  characterize  the  entire 
post-World  War  II  period,  it  was  in  the  1970s  that  European  and 
Japanese  competitors  caught  up  to  the  United  States  and  a  major  upward 
shift  in  the  technical  ability  and  incentive  to  move  production  to 
developing  countries  took  place.  Faced  with  a  growing  threat  from 
imports  at  the  same  time  that  opportunities  to  realize  lower  labor  costs 
through  outsourcing  and  plant  relocation  were  increasing,  many  U.S. 
firms  responded  by  making  wage  and  benefits  cuts  their  top  priority. 
Although  other  developed  nations  have  faced  these  same  pressures  and 
opportunities,  only  in  the  United  States  did  the  outcome  of  adjustment 
to  globalization  generate  collapsing  real  wages  for  low-  and  moderate- 
skill  workers. 
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The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  U.S.  experience  has  been  the  massive 
political  and  ideological  shift  in  public  opinion,  management  beliefs, 
and  government  policy,  which  facilitated  and  actively  encouraged  an 
assault  by  employers  on  the  wages  of  those  with  the  least  bargaining 
power-the  low-skilled.  It  is  widely  recognized  that  throughout  this  ten- 
tury  there  has  been  a  “public-private  cycle”  (Schlesinger  1986):  the 
192Os,  19SOs,  and  1980s  stand  out  as  periods  in  which  public  ideology 
and  government  policy  shifted  strongly  away  from  government  toward 
market  solutions.  There  are,  as  Hirschman  (1982)  puts  it,  “oscillations 
between  periods  of  intense  preoccupation  with  public  issues  and  of 
almost  total  concentration  on  individual  improvement  and  private  wcl- 
fare  goals.”  Reflecting  such  a  change  in  national  preferences,  policies  ini- 
tiated  during  the  Carter  administration  set  the  stage  for  the  Reagan  years 
and  what  Kevin  Phillips  ( 1991)  h as  called  “one  of  America’s  ‘capitalist 
blowouts.“’  Phillips  points  to  the  ideological  underpinnings  of  the  radical 
redirection  of  government  policy  and  the  predictable  consequences  for 
the  distribution  of  income. 
In  each  of  the  three  great  U.S.  capitalist  eras  .  .  .  genuine 
(laissez-faire)  philosophic  and  cultural  conviction  expanded, 
elevated,  and  prolonged  the  wave  of  capitalist  expansion.  .  .  . 
the  resemblance  between  the  policy  framework  of  the  198Os, 
the  Coolidge  era  and  the  Gilded  Age  was  not  a  coincidence. 
Striking  similarities  existed  in  fiscal,  monetary,  deregulatory, 
and  reduced-government  approaches-and  led  to  similar 
inequalities  of  wealth  and  income  distribution.  The  new  eco- 
nomics  of  the  1980s  had  gained  momentum,  to  he  sure,  hecause 
of  a  preetistig,  broader  national  conservative  trend  and  coali- 
tion,  reinforced  in  the  late  1970s  hy  a  larger  wave  of  inflation 
and  popular  frustration  with  big  government.  Yet  it  was 
absolutely  critical  that  reemergent  capitalism  also  enjoyed 
something  more:  a  missionary  spirit-and  dedicated  mission- 
aries.  (Phillips  1991) 
The  political  swing  from  public  action  to  private  interest  has  been  mani- 
fested  in  government  pohcies  that  actively  promote  or  facilitate  market 
solutions  and  employer  interests.  Deregulation  has  contributed  to  greater 
competition  in  product  markets,  particularly  in  trucking,  airlines,  bus  trans- The  Cohpse  of  Low-SkiU  Wages 
portation,  and  telecommunications-all  formerly  high-wage  industries. 
The  decline  in  antitrust  enforcement  encouraged  the  mergers  and  acquisi- 
tions  that  led  to  the  restructuring  of  many  firms,  often  at  the  expense  of 
well-paid  workers.  President  Reagan’s  highly  publicized  attack  on  the  air 
traffic  controllers  in  1981  set  the  stage  for  changes  that  weakened  labor  law 
and  its  enforcement  and  allowed  a  30  percent  decline  in  the  value  of  the 
legal  minimum  wage.  A  radical  change  in  the  composition  and  leadership 
of  the  National  Labor  Relations  Roan!  also  had  profound  effects  on  the  bal- 
ance  of  power  between  management  and  workers.21 
Equally  important,  pressure  from  the  financial  sector  on  firms  to  adopt 
short-run  profit-maximizing  strategies  increased  dramatically  in  the 
1970s  and  198Os.22  A  good  example  is  provided  by  Albert  Dunlap,  the 
former  CEO  of  Scott  Paper,  who,  in  an  article  in  ?kqwr’s by  Clara  and 
Noer  (1996),  is  quoted  as  saying  that  “the  responsibility  of  the  CEO  is  to 
deliver  shareholder  value.  Period.  It’s  the  shareholders  who  own  the  core 
poration.  They  take  all  the  risk.  And  how  does  the  CEO  maximize 
value?  He  does  that  by  focusing  on  profit.  .  .  .  sometimes  you  have  to  get 
rid  of  people.”  Dunlap  was  successful.  According  to  Clara  and  Noer,  dure 
ing  Dunlap’s  two  years  at  Scott  Paper  “he  increased  the  company’s  stock 
price  by  225  percent,  laid  off  11,000  workers,  and  arranged  for  the  corn- 
pany  to  be  purchased  by  Kimberly-Clark,  one  of  its  biggest  competitors.” 
The  exclusive  concern  with  maximizing  shareholder  value  in  the  short- 
run  was  a  new  development  in  the  1980s;  it  was  a  concern  that  would 
have  been  socially  unacceptable  to  articulate,  much  less  put  into  prac- 
tice,  in  earlier  decades. 
Taking  the  Low  Road 
Employers  responded  to  competitive  pressures  and  opportunities  with 
labor  practices  that  reflected  the  prevailing  laissez-faire  thinking.  The 
new  business-friendly  political  environment  encouraged  the  use  of  low- 
road  management  strategies  by  employers.  By  the  end  of  the  decade 
there  had  been  a  fundamental  shift  in  the  human  resource  policies  of 
firms  and  the  legal  rules  governing  employment  practices.  As  Wachter 
and  Carter  (1989)  explain, 
Until  the  late  1970s  or  198Os,  firms  rarely  made  use  of  their 
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rights  under  Ma&y  R&o  to  hire  permanent  replacements. 
Instead,  firms  used  managers  to  replace  striking  workers  tem- 
porarily.  When  replacement  workers  were  hired,  they  were  sel- 
dom  offered  permanent  jobs.  When  strikes  occur  today, 
replacement  workers  are  more  likely  to  be  offered  permanent 
jobs.  .  .  .  The  rules  governing  plant  closings  and  relocation  are 
based  on  newer  decisions.  .  .  .  In  simple  terms,  the  rules  mean 
that  management  decisions  to  implement  partial  plant  closing, 
work  relocation,  asset  sales,  and  even  some  types  of  subcon- 
tracting  are  not  mandatory  topics  [for  bargaining], 
Concession  bargaining  became  widespread  by  the  mid  1980s.  Mitchell 
(1985)  shows  that  rhe  proportion  of  workers  subject  to  major  private 
union  settlements  whose  wages  were  frozen  or  cut  ranged  from  0  percent 
to  5  percent  from  1964  to  1980,  rose  to  8  percent  in  1981,  and  jumped 
to  44  percent  in  1982.  The  rate  then  fell  to  37  percent  in  1983,  23  per- 
cent  in  1984,  and  26  percent  in  1985.  Just  2  percent  of  settlements  had 
no  first-year  wage  increase  in  1981,  but  this  figure  rose  to  12  percent  in 
1982  and  ranged  from  25  to  37  percent  between  1983  and  1988 
(Mitchell  1989).  These  data  clearly  indicate  a  strong  shift  toward  con- 
frontation  by  employers  in  the  early  1980s. 
The  relocation  of  operations  to  low-wage  sites  also  had  a  downward 
effect  on  the  relative  earnings  of  many  low-skill  workers.  Although  sta- 
tistical  evidence  is  hard  to  come  by,  the  anecdotal  evidence  is  over- 
whelming.  For  example,  according  to  spokespersons  of  Pratt  and 
Whimey,  the  firm’s  decision  to  relocate  as  many  as  9,000  high-paying 
production  jobs  from  a  high-skill  state  (Connecticut)  to  lower-skill  states 
(Maine  and  Georgia)  was  expressly  designed  to  reduce  labor  costs 
(Judson  1993).  Employers  such  as  Pratt  and  Whitney  evidently  did  not 
relocate  as  a  result  of  shifts  in  their  demand  for  skills  and  the  introduc- 
tion  of  new  workplace  technoIogies,  but  because  of  a  preference  for  pay- 
ing  much  lower  wages  to  workers  with  the  same  level  of  skill  and  for 
similar  tasks.23 
Another  tactic  used  to  reduce  labor  costs  was  to  substitute  part-time 
workers  and  temporary  workers  for  permanent,  full-time  workers.  The 
temporary  help  industry  grew  eight  times  faster  than  employment  in  all 
nonagricultural  industries  between  1978  and  1985  and  increased  from 
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620,500  workers  in  1984  to  1,031,SOO  workers  in  1989  (Car&  1992). 
Citing  Katharine  Abraham’s  estimate  from  an  employer  survey  that 
there  were  1.5  million  temporary  help  workers,  short-term  hires,  and  on- 
call  workers  in  1986,  Carrg  estimates  that  there  were  over  2  million 
“contingent”  workers  by  1989.  Relying  largely  on  the  work  of  Osterman 
(1988)  and  Golden  and  Appelbaum  (1990),  Carrb  concludes  that 
“changes  in  firm  demand  for  labor  rather  than  changes  in  workers’  pref- 
erences  have  driven  the  rapid  growth  of  contingent  labor  in  the  1980s.” 
She  also  points  out  that  not  only  do  contingent  workers  offer  lower  labor 
costs,  but  they  add  flexibility-management  gains  greater  control  over 
work  schedules  and  the  way  tasks  are  petformed. 
Government  social  policy  has  also  contributed  to  the  undermining  of 
traditional  wage-setting  norms  in  the  private  sector.  The  United  States 
continues  to  rely  heavily  on  employers  to  provide  health  insurance,  pen- 
sions,  child  care,  and  other  fundamental  benefits-benefits  that  repre- 
sent  labor  costs  to  employers.  These  costs  are  assumed  by  the  public 
sector  in  most  other  developed  countries.  As  the  costs  of  benefits  rise, 
our  “privatized”  benefits  system  encourages  employers  to  substitute  part- 
time  and  temporary  low-wage  jobs,  increasing  both  the  share  of  low- 
wage  earners  and  wage  inequality. 
Such  fundamental  alterations  in  traditional  employment  and  wage- 
setting  practices  within  the  firm  require  various  institutional  changes. 
Blackburn,  Bloom,  and  Freeman  (1990)  show  that  changes  in  union 
density  and  the  value  of  the  minimum  wage  both  help  explain  the 
decline  in  the  relative  wages  of  low-skill  men.  DiNardo,  Fortin,  and 
Lemieux  (1994)  present  striking  evid;nce  on  the  central  role  played  by 
the  declining  value  of  the  minimum  wage  in  the  collapse  of  wages  at  the 
bottom  of  the  wage  distribution,  concluding  that  “labor  market  institu- 
tions  are  at  least  as  important  as  supply  and  demand  considerations  in 
explaining  changes  in  the  U.S.  distribution  of  wages  from  1973  to  1992.” 
The  undermining  of  traditional  wage-setting  institutions  may  also  help  to 
explain  the  increase  in  wage  inequality  within  industry,  gender,  education, 
and  experience  groups.  Wage  norms  appear  to  have  broken  down  within 
firms  (as  internal  labor  markets  opened  up  to  external  competition),  with. 
in  industries  (as  increasing  competition  caused  differences  among  firms  to 
become  a  more  critical  factor  in  wage  outcomes),  and  among  communities htitutionul  Faiit.m twul the American Wmkm 
(as  transportation  and  telecommunications  facilitated  the  relocation  of 
some,  but  not  all,  firms  to  lower-wage  areas).  In  short,  the  “law  of  one 
price”  may  have  been  undermined,  not  promoted,  by  the  wage  restructur- 
ing.  Take,  for  example,  the  airline  industry.  With  deregulation  “employees 
at  smaller  carriers  like  Republic  actually  saw  their  pay  go  up  when  bigger 
airlines,  like  Northwest,  took  them  over  and  brought  in  higher  wage 
scales.  But  many  have  felt  the  pain  as  the  competition  set  off  by  deregulas 
tion  put  relentless  pressures on  costs.  . .  .”  (Bryant  1993) 
The  consequence  of  low-road  employment  policies-the  war  on  labor 
unions,  demands  for  wage  concessions,  plant  relocation,  outsourcing, 
and  an  increased  reliance  on  contingent  workers-has  been  declining 
real  wages  for  those  with  the  least  skills  and,  as  Harrison  (1994)  has 
described  it,  a  job  structure  that  is  being  transformed  from  one  with  a 
diamond  shape  (lots  of  good,  relatively  low-skilled  jobs)  to  one  with  an 
hourglass  shape  (only  the  best  and  worst  jobs  are  expanding).  Similarly, 
Levy  and  Mumane  (1992)  conclude  that  “the  male  earnings  distribution 
has  ‘hollowed  out,’  leaving  larger  percentages  of  workers  at  the  top  and 
bottom  of  the  distribution,  and  a  smaller  percentage  in  the  middle.” 
The  difficulties  posed  by  the  measurement  and  the  interdependence  of 
the  key  determinants  make  this  institutionalist  explanation  easier  to  dia- 
gram  than  to  test  statistically.  But  the  importance  of  changes  in  trade 
patterns,  unionization  rates,  and  the  value  of  the  minimum  wage  on  rela- 
tive  wages  in  recent  empirical  studies  supports  this  approach,  as  does  the 
anecdcml  evidence  on  wage  concessions,  outsourcing,  plant  relocation, 
and  the  use  of  contingent  and  part-time  workers.  For  purposes  of  both 
coherence  and  policymaking  regarding  the  wage  collapse,  it  is  crucial 
that  thcsc  proximate  determinants  be  understood  in  the  larger  context  of 
a  new,  more  competitive  business  environment  in  which  political  and 
ideological  shifts  have  lifted  the  constraints  on  the  adoption  of  the  low- 
road  management  strategies. 
Poliiy  lmplicatiins 
The  policy  implications  of  these  alternative  explanations  are  profoundly 
different.  If  the  rising  incidence  of  low  wages  and  the  growth  of  earnings 
inequality  over  the  last  two  decades  can  be  attributed  to  declining  job The Colhpse of Low-Still  wages 
opportunities  for  low-skill  workers  due  to  technological  change,  a  sensible 
policy  would  be  to  reduce  the  share  of  workers  with  low  skills.  The  solu- 
tion  to  the  wage  collapse  would  be  more  and  better  education  and  train- 
ing  and  perhaps  a  tougher  approach  to  legal  and  illegal  immigration.  In 
sharp  contrast,  the  institutionalist  explanation  suggests  reversing  the 
trend  of  declining  real  (and  relative)  wages  of  low-skill  workers  through 
public  policies  that  address  not  just  worker  characteristics,  but  the  way 
wage-setting  institutions  work,  both  inside  and  outside  the  firm. 
Can  we  solve  the  earnings  problem  through  skill  upgrading?  Even  assum- 
ing  the  political  feasibility  of  what  would  be  an  expensive  program,  there 
are  a  number  of  difficulties  with  a  massive  program  of  skill  upgrading  for 
the  least  skilled  if  the  problem  it  seeks  to  address  was  caused  largely  by  a 
decline  in  bargaining  power  due  to  changes  in  labor  market  institutions 
and  shifts  in  social  norms.  First,  the  payoff  to  investments  in  “hard” 
skills,  such  as  literacy,  takes  time.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  much  impact  on 
the  wage  structure  in  less  than  one  generation.  Second,  many  of  the 
skills  employers  demand  are  “soft”  skills-work  habits  and  attitudes. 
These  are  traits  that  are  developed  in  childhood  in  families,  schools,  and 
communities.  Upgrading  the  soft  skills  of  adults  through  government 
programs  is  likely  to  be  even  more  chall.enging  than  improving  their 
hard  skills. 
Third,  labor  market  forces  will  tend  to  undermine  the  objectives  of  ski11 
upgrading.  Close  to  two-thirds  of  all  jobs  currently  require  only  a  high 
school  degree  or  less.  Successful  skill  upgrading  for  the  workers  now  filling 
these  jobs  is  only  part  of  the  task.  We  would  also  need  to  supply  jobs  that 
require  higher  skills  and  pay  higher  wages.  Without  such  job  creation,  a 
larger  supply  of  moderately  skilled  workers  will  tend  to  bid  down  the  wages 
of  moderately  skilled  jobs.  And  who  would  then  do  all  the  unskilled  jobs? 
Without  tougher  immigration  enforcement  policies,  a  skill  upgrading  pm- 
gram  runs  the  risk  of  increasing  the  incentive  for  illegal  immigration.  A 
program  that  succeeded  in  substantially  increasing  the  skills  of  large  num- 
bers  of  workers  who  are  currently  paid  low  wages  might  result  in  a  more 
highly  skilled  native-born  workforce  that  experiences  declining  real  wages 
at  the  same  time  that  the  number  and  share  of  low-skill  foreign-born 
workers  incrcdse-  replay  of  our  experience  in  the  1980s. 
Finally,  if  we  optimistically  suppose  that  high-end  estimates  of  the  mar- 
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ginal  return  to  investment  in  education  and  training  for  individuals  (say 
10  percent)  can  be  applied  to  the  entire  low-skill  workforce,  the  cost  to 
the  public  sector  of  providing  the  kind  of  education  and  training  neces- 
sary  to  counteract  recent  earnings  trends  would  be  enormous.  Heckman 
(1994)  shows  that  a  10  percent  return  on  investment  in  human  capital 
would  require  an  investment  of  $214  b  i  11  ion  (1989  dollars)  to  restore  the 
earnmgs  of  male  high  school  dropouts  to  their  1979  real  level.  A  further 
$212  billion  would  be  required  to  restore  the  earnings  of  all  high  school 
graduates  to  their  real  1979  level.  To  restore  the  ratio  of  earnings  of  cold 
lege  graduates  to  earnings  of  less-educated  workers  to  its  1979  level 
would  cost  more  than  $1.66  trillion. 
Few  would,  or  should,  oppose  public  sector  efforts  to  raise  the  skill  level  of 
the  workforce,  but  the  ability  of  workers  to  perform  the  functions 
required  in  technologically  advanced  workplaces  had  little  to  do  with  the 
startling  growth  in  poverty-wage  jobs,  the  drop  in  real  earnings,  and  the 
growth  of  earnings  inequality  in  the  1980s.  We  need  to  improve  our  edu- 
cation  and  training  system,  but  making  workers  “smarter”  will  not,  by 
itself,  have  much  effect  on  the  distribution  of  earnings  and  certainly  not 
within  the  next  decade.  Besides,  most  jobs  will  continue  to  require  less 
than  a  college  degree,  and  a  labor  market  that  increasingly  offers  poverty- 
wage  jobs  to  workers  with  that  level  of  educational  attainment  provides 
workers  with  little  incentive  to  invest  in  education  and  training,  no  mat- 
ter  how  well  such  programs  are  designed  and  implemented. 
An  alternative  policy  to  raise  the  after-tax  incomes  of  low-wage  workers 
is  the  earned  income  tax  credit  (EITC),  which  offers  a  reduced  tax  bill  or 
a  rebate  check  based  on  a  family’s  level  of  earnings  and  number  of  chil- 
dren.  The  EITC  has  been  an  effective  means  of  modestly  raising  the  take- 
home  income  of  some  low-wage  families,  but  in  an  era  of  heightened 
concern  over  the  budget  deficit  and  strong  resistance  to  redistribution 
through  the  tax  code,  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  EITC  can  be  greatly 
expanded.  The  wage  collapse  has  simply  been  too  massive  for  a  redistribu- 
tive  tax  program  of  this  sort  to  offset  more  than  a  small  part  of  the  losses 
experienced  by  those  with  less  than  a  college  degree.  Furthermore,  heavy 
reliance  on  the  EITC  has  the  perverse  effect  of  ratifying,  and  even 
encouraging,  the  very  practices  by  employers  that  produced  the  need  for 
the  credit  in  the  first  place,  namely,  low-road  competitive  strategies  that 
reduce  costs  by  targeting  the  wages  and  benefits  of  those  with  the  least 
bargaining  power. 
Public  Policy  Brief The  Collapse of Low-Skill Wages 
An  effective  public  policy  response  must  address  the  roots  of  the  eam- 
ings  problem.  We  have  come  to  rely  too  heavily  on  competition  in  labor 
markets  to  set  wages  and  employment  conditions.  The  wage-setting 
institutions  that  sheltered  low-skill  workers  from  the  worst  excesses  of 
labor  market  competition  and  encouraged  management-labor  coopera- 
tion  need  to  be  reestablished  and  new  institutions  that  can  more  effec- 
tively  serve  these  purposes  should  be  explored.  While  the  details  of  such 
a  policy  require  careful  debate,  the  direction  to  take  is  clear. 
Strengthening  the  ability  of  workers  to  bargain  collectively  and  revers- 
ing  the  35  percent  decline  in  value  of  the  minimum  wage  since  the 
1960s  would  be  a  good  place  to  start. 
Orher  nations  have  chosen  to  operate  under  different  labor  nmrket  rules. 
As  Freeman  (1994b)  points  out,  “the  United  Srates  represents  the 
decentralized  extreme  in  wage  setting.”  Still,  since  the  late  l97Os,  politi- 
cal  choices  have  been  made  to  move  further  in  this  decenualized  direc- 
.  tion,  and  wage-setting  institutions  that  once  provided  some  protection 
for  workers  from  labor  market  competition  have  been  undermined  or  dis- 
mantled.  It  was  no  coincidence  that  among  developed  countries,  only 
Great  Britain-also  relatively  decentralized-experienced  a  comparable 
increase  in  inequality.  But  the  U.K.  experience  was  unlike  the  U.S. 
experience  in  one  crucial  respect:  real  earnings  among  the  least-skilled 
increased.  The  collapse  of  wages  for  those  with  low  educational  attain- 
ment  was  a  uniquely  American  experience.  While  collective  bargaining 
agreements  set  wage  and  employment  conditions  for  I8  percent  of 
American  workers,  they  cover  more  than  80  percent  of  workers  in 
Sweden,  Germany,  Belgium,  France,  and  Austria  (Freeman  1995).  The 
minimum  wage  in  France  is  set  at  60  percent  of  the  average  wage,  almost 
twice  as  high  as  that  in  the  United  States.24 
Indeed,  strong  labor  market  institutions  currently  prevail  in  varying 
forms  in  all  of  the  United  States’s  developed  country  competitors.  These 
nations  faced  the  same  competitive  pressures  from  the  same  global  mar- 
ketplace,  but,  unlike  the  United  States,  in  the  1980s  they  did  not  allow 
their  labor  unions  to  be  crushed,  the  legal  minimum  wage  to  plummet  in 
value,  the  balance  of  trade  in  durable  goods  to  collapse,  and  the  public 
social  safety  net  to  be  dismantled.  The  United  States  should  take  the 
advice  of  Richard  Freeman  ( 1994c),  who,  on  the  basis  of  lessons  learned 
The Jsrome  Lev  Economics Institute  of  Bard Col&e  39 institutional Pa&e  and &e American Worker 
from  a  major  study  of  labor  markets  from  around  the  developed  world, 
concluded  that  “the  declining  position  of  American  workers  relative  to 
thosq  in  other  advanced  countries  shows  clearly  that  it  is  appropriate  to 
reconsider  our  labor  institutiops  in  light  of  experiences  elsewhere.” 
Notes  , 
I.  AGerage  weekly  earnings  are  deflated  by  the  CPI-U  index  (Council  of 
Economic  Advisers  1991,  Tabl&  B-44  and  B+S8). 
2.  Y)veral~,  the  gab  in  weekly  wages  between  men  at  the  10th  and  men  at  the 
90th  percentile  has  grown  about  35  percent  since  1967.  In  the  period  since 
1979,  this  growing  gap  is  the  result  of  substantial  declines  in  real  wages at 
the  bottom  of  the  distribution  and  more  modest  gains  at  the  top”  (Karoly 
1994,  p.  56). 
3.  The  increase  in  earnings  among  workers nex  the  top  of  the  earnings  ladder 
appears  to  be  due  exchisively  to  the  increased  earnings  of  those  with  posts 
gradtiate  schooling  (Mishel  and  Bernstein  1995).  From  another  perspective, 
the  growth  in  pay at  the  top  appears not  to  be  a hnction  of  whether  or  not 
one  his  a  college  degree,  but  to  be  related  to  an  increase  in  earnings  among 
the  top  1 percent  of  earners  (Gramlich,  Kasten,  and  Sammartino  1994). 
4.  Citing  the  work  of  Blackbum,  Bloom,  and  Freeman  (1990)  and  Kosters 
(199lb),  Burtless  (1991)  states  that  “the  supply  of  highly  skilled  workers 
more  than  kept  pace  with  demand  through  the  197Os,  when  the  wage pre- 
mium  for  schooling  shrank  slightly.  But  the  anemic  growth  of  a  highly 
skilled  labot  supply in  the  1980s  led  to  a  sharp  rise  in  the  premium  for  edu- 
cation  and  skill.” 
5.  In  an  influential  paper,  Bound  and  Johnson  (1992)  assert  that  the  “major 
cause  [of  relative  wage changes  in  the  1980~1 was  a  shift  in  the  skill  stmc- 
ture  of  labor  dernidnd brought  about  by  biased  technological  change.” 
Similarly,  Acs  and  Danziger  (1993)  conclude.  that  since  most  of  the  decline 
in  earnings  is  found  within  industries  among  workers having  the  same  edu- 
cation  and  experience  levels,  standard  measures  used  in  earnings  studies 
cannot  account  for  the  decline;  therefore,  “changes  in  technology,  whether 
autonomous  or  in  response  to  foreign  competition,  provide  the  most 
plausible  explanation  for  the  fall  in  meAn earnings.” 
4.  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1991)  are  quite  explicit  about  the  reasons  for  labor 
economists’  recent  attention  to  computerization:  ‘Skill-biased  technical 
change  will  play  a  major  role  in  any  satisfactory  neoc&tiol  explanation  for 
recent  Changes in  th& wage structure”  (emphasis added). 
7.  Although  they  do  not  seem to  think  that  the  timing  of restructuring  matters 
for  their  story,  Berman,  Bound,  and  Griliches  (1994)  do  recognize  that 
employment  shifts were concentrated  in  the  1980  to  1982  period.  “Roughly 
70  percent  of  the  within-industry  and  over  80  percent  of  the  between- 
’  industry  sliifts  .  .  .  that  occurred  between  1979  and  1987  did  so  between 
1979  and  1982.” 










The  timing  of  these  employment  and  investment  trends  is  also  relevant  to 
the  interpretation  of  the  regression  results  presented  in  the  Berman,  Bound, 
and  Griliches  study.  They  regress  the  1979  to  1987  change  in  the  nonpro- 
auction  share  of  employment  across  industries  on  the  level  of  and  change  in 
the  share  of  computers  in  total  investment.  Their  estimated  coefficient.  are 
positive.  They  conclude  that  this  measure  of  technological  change  accounts 
for  “onesquarter  to  one-half  of  the  within-industry  move  away  from  produc- 
tion  labor  that  occurred  over  the  1980s”  (Berm+n,  Bound,  and  Griliches 
1994).  Is  it  plausible  that  investment  in  computers,  which  tbok  place 
almost  entirely  after  1982,  can  explain  up  to  half  of  the  shift  away  horn  pro- 
duction  labor,  which  occurred  entirely  before  1983?  Interestingly,  they  note 
that  their  1977  to  1987  computer  variables  and  their  1974  measure  of  R&D 
are  also  powerful  predicton  of  nonproduction  employment  trends  for  1959 
to  1973,  a  period  with  virtually  no  computer  investment. 
Because  sales  jobs  range  from  low-  to  high-skill  (from  cashiers  to  insurance 
agents),  those  jobs  are  considered  as  a  separate  category.  Private  household 
and  farm  occupations  are  omitted  from  the  analysis. 
The=  figures  are  taken  from  three  different  tables.  The  wage  and  supply 
estimates  are  for  workers  with  one  to  five  years  of  experience,  while  the 
demand  estimates  are  for  workers  at  all  experience  levels.  My  interpretation 
of  these  results  requires  an  assumption  that  the  change  in  demand  for  all 
low-skill  workers  is  not  dramatically  different  from  the  change  in  demand 
for  those  with  one  to  five  years  of  experience. 
Since  the  simple  demand  and  supply  model  assumes  that  the  wage  distribu- 
tion  mirrors  the  skill  distribution,  changes  in  the  wage  distribution  should 
reflect  changes  in  the  skill  distribution.  In  this  case,  we  should  observe  a 
decline  in  the  share  of  those  employed  at  low  wages.  While  a  surplus  pool  of 
low-skill  workers  will  push  the  wage  down,  the  mismatch  (skill  twist)  story 
posits  declining  low-skill  job  opportunities  so  that  the  pool  of  jobs  for  which 
these  low-skill  workers  are  competing  is shrinking. 
This  assumption  is  made  explicitly  and  relied  upon  in  many  empirical  stia- 
ies.  For  example,  Topel  (1993)  writes,  “I  will  define  relative  marketable 
‘skills’  in  terms  of  a  person’s  position  in  the  overall  distribution  of  wages.” 
Those  with  low  skills  lucky  enough  to  get  the  increasingly  scarce  jobs  might 
have  seen  their  wages  hid  down,  but  there  should  have  been  fewer  workers 
employed  in  this  low-skill  job  pool  and  more  jobless  workers.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  presence  of  too  many  low-skill  workers  should  not  have  directly 
affected  the  wages  for  high-skill  jobs  since  low-skill  workers  are  not,  pre- 
sumably,  easily  substitutable  for  high-skill  workers. 
For  details  on  the  method,  see  Howell  (1996). 
These  estimates  are  conservative  since  temporary  workers,  whose  share  of 
employment  greatly  expanded  in  the  198Os,  are  defined  as  service  sector 
workers  and  are  not  included  in  the  data. 
The  study  defines  displacement  as  “job  l-s  due  to  plant  closings  or  moves, 
slack  work,  or  the  abolishment  of  their  positions  or  shifts.” 
High-wage  blue-collar  workers  were  certainly  hard  hit  by  the  198Os, but  there 
is no  evidence  that  these  were  workers  with  specialized  skills  or  that  their  skills 
became  obsolete  at  a  rate  that  was  substantially  greater  &an  in  earlier  decades. 







This  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  the  evidence  that  the  return  to  col- 
lege  education  rose  sharply  in  the  1980s.  While  growth  in  the  “redundant” 
portion  of  the  college-educated  labor  supply  will  tend  to  reduce  the  absolute 
value  of  this  return,  increasing  earnings  by  the  unaffected  (higher-skill)  part 
of  the  college-educated  pool  could  more  than  offset  this  effect.  Furthermore, 
the  increasing  competition  for  lower-skill  jobs  by  the  redundant  college- 
educated  workforce  will  also  tend  to  lower  the  wage  of  those  with  low  edu- 
cational  attainment.  A  large  part  of  the  growth  in  the  wage  gap  between 
college  and  high  school  degree  holders  was  due  to  the  decline  in  the  eam- 
ings  of  the  latter  (see  Table  1). 
Kaufman  (1988)  writes  that  ‘%s  DKLR  [Dunlop,  Kerr,  Lester,  and  Reynolds] 
intuited,  and  Waker  Oi  (1962)  and  Gary  Becker  (1964)  later  showed  more 
rigorously,  firm-specific  training  creates  its  own  area  of  indeterminacy  in  wage 
rates-competition  places  upper  and  lower  limits  to  the  wage  bargain,  but 
within  these  limits  the  wage  is  indeterminate  until  explicitly  set  by  unilateral 
management  decision,  individual  bargaining,  or  collective  bargaining.” 
For  a  survey  of  the  literature  on  the  effects  of  trade,  see  Burtless  (1995).  For 
the  effects  of  unions  and  the  minimum  wage,  see  Blackbum,  Bloom,  and 
Freeman  (1990);  Freeman  (1994a);  and  DiNardo,  Fortin,  and  Lemieux 
(1994).  Focusing  on  the  effects  of  unions  and  the  minimum  wage  on  rela- 
tive  wages,  DiNardo,  Fortin,  and  Lemieux  find  that  “labor  market  institu- 
tions  are  at  least  as  important  as  supply  and  demand  considerations  in 
explaining  changes  in  the  U.S.  distribution  of  wages  from  1973  to  1992.” 
For  a  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  effects  of  the  minimum  wage  on 
employment  and  relative  wages,  see  Card  and  Krueger  (1995). 
Summarizing  research  by  Ferguson  and  Rogers,  David  Gordon  (1996)  writes 
that  “In  1975-76,  an  average  of  84  percent  of  unfair  labor  practice  corn- 
plaints  against  corporations  were  sustained  in  whole  or  substantial  part, 
favoting  the  union  side  of  the  complaint.  By  1984-85,  that  average  had 
dropped  to  52  percent.  In  1975-76,  similarly,  65  percent  of  “representation” 
cases  .  .  . were  decided  in  favor  of  the  union  position.  By  1984-85  that  per- 
centage  had  declined  to  35  percent.” 
Sommarizing  research  by  Michael  Porter,  Bennett  Harrison  (1992)  writes 
that  “real  capital  formation  in  the  U.S.  since  the  1960s  has  been  distorted 
by  rules,  procedures,  and  customs  governing  private  sector  allocation  of  cap- 
ital.  .  .  .  In  1960,  big  institutional  stockholders  in  the  U.S.-the  pension 
and  mutual  funds-held  on  to  a  share  on  average  for  seven  years.  By  the 
198Os,  the  average  period  had  fallen  to  only  about  two  years.” 
Similarly,  as  reported  in  The  New  York  7’imes  (McQuiston  1994), 
Grumman’s  manufacturing  operations  were  transferred  from  Long  Island  to 
Florida  and  Louisiana  to  reduce  labor  costs.  Another  recent  New  York  Times 
report  (Shenon  1993)  documents  the  substantial  demand  for  extremely 
low-skill  labor  in  the  1980s  in  Saipan  and  other  U.S.-owned  islands  in  the 
South  Pacific,  where  some  20,000  workers,  tecruited  primarily  from  main- 
land  China,  typically  put  in  six  days  a  week  for  half  the  minimum  wage 
making  American  brandname  clothes,  As  the  demand  for  low-skill  workers 
willing  to  accept  poverwlevel  wages  expanded  in  these  offshore  U.S.  terri- 
tories  in  the  198Os,  low+skill  but  livingwage  garment  jobs  decreased  in  the 
continental  United  States. 
It  is  often  claimed  that  the  high  unemployment  currently  experienced  by 
some  European  nations  indicates  that  a  high  price  would  be  paid  for 
lnstitutiond  Fuihre  and  the  American  Worker 
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maintaining  traditional  shelters  from  wage  competition  for  low-wage  work- 
ers.  I  am  unaware  of  any  serious  research  that  has  made  a  compelling  case 
that  wage  inflexibility  accounts  for  the  recent  increases  in  unemployment 
in  these  countries,  but  there  is  a  recent  study  that  challenges  that  idea. 
Card,  Kramarz,  and  Lemieux  (1995)  write  that  “taking  the  evidence  for  the 
United  States,  Canada,  and  France  as  a  whole,  we  conclude  that  it  is  very 
difficult  to  maintain  the  hypothesis  that  the  ‘wage  inflexibility’  in  Canada 
and  France  translated  into  greater  relative  employment  losses  for  less+killed 
workers  in  these  countries.” 
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